Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

Utah v. Tomas R. Herrera and Mikell Sweezey :
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Christine F. Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Mark R. Moffat; Richard P. Mauro; Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Lisa J. Remal;
Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Herrera, No. 920209.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4158

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KFU

BRlEfi

45.9

DOCKET NO/2^2dfl3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TOMAS R. HERRERA,

:

De fendant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 920209

:

and

:

MIKELL SWEEZEY,

:

Case No. 920265

:

Priority No. 11

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Interlocutory appeals from orders denying Defendants'
motions to "Declare Utah Statutory Scheme in Regards to Mentally 111
Offenders Unconstitutional." The Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge,
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah issued the
order being appealed by Appellant Herrera on April 3, 1992. The
Honorable Michael R. Murphy issued the order being appealed by
Appellant Sweezey on April 20, 1992.
MARK R. MOFFAT
RICHARD P. MAURO
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant Herrera
LISA J. REMAL
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant Sweezey
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

p-

FILED
StP 2 3 1993

CLERK SUPREME COURT,
UTAH
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TOMAS R. HERRERA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 920209

:

and

:

MIKELL SWEEZEY,

:

Case No. 920265

:

Priority No. 11

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Interlocutory appeals from orders denying Defendants'
motions to "Declare Utah Statutory Scheme in Regards to Mentally 111
Offenders Unconstitutional." The Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge,
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah issued the
order being appealed by Appellant Herrera on April 3, 1992. The
Honorable Michael R. Murphy issued the order being appealed by
Appellant Sweezey on April 20, 1992.
MARK R. MOFFAT
RICHARD P. MAURO
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant Herrera
LISA J. REMAL
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant Sweezey
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

INTRODUCTION

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME VIOLATES FEDERAL
DUE PROCESS IN THAT IT ELIMINATES AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE OF INSANITY WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM.
POINT II. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME DENIES
DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTION.

4

11

POINT III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 IS ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
A.

...

APPELLANT HERRERA HAS STANDING

B. THE STATUTE ARBITRARILY DIFFERENTIATES
BETWEEN DELUSIONAL OFFENDERS
POINT IV.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-4 VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS AND THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
CONCLUSION

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
17
20
21
23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED
Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1962), overruled
in part on other grounds. Fields v. State,
487 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1971)
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866,
68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981)
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1780,

118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992)
Haas v. Abrahamson, 910 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1990)
Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska App. 1985)

..
. ..

Hicks v. State, 352 S.E.2d 762 (Ga. 1987), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987)
Jessner v. State, 231 N.W. 634 (Wis. 1930)
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043,
77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983)
Leiand v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002,
96 L.Ed.2d 1302 (1952)
Maas v. Territory, 63 P. 960 (Okla. 1901)
M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843)
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145,
20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968)

State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27 (Utah 1990)
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)
State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621 (Utah 1987)
State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177 (Utah 1931)
State v. Mewhinney, 134 P. 632 (Utah 1913)

ii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1987)

...

State v. Poulson, 381 P.2d 93 (Utah 1963)

7
15

State v. Rhoades, 809 P.2d 455 (Idaho 1991)

19, 20

State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990)

1, 10

State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982)

15

State v. Turrentine, 730 P.2d 238 (Ariz. App. 1986) .

17

State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993)
Territory v. Catton, 16 P. 902 (1888), reversed on
on other grounds, 130 U.S. 83 (1889)
United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir.
1990)
United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir.
1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988) . . . .

3, 10, 15
14, 15
16
17

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103

7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1973)

15, 17

Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4

21

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1) (b)

20

Utah Code Ann. § 77-169-203

20

Amend. V, U.S. Constitution

21, 22
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Lester E. Bush, Jr., Health and Medicine Among the
Latter-Day Saints; Science, Sense and Scripture
119 (1993)

iii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12, 14

A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (1967)
Wayne LaFave, 1 Substantive Criminal Law (1986) . . .
R. D. MacKay, Post-Hinckley Insanity in the U.S.A.,
1988 Crim. L. Rev. 88
Charles R. McKell, "The Utah State Hospital: A Study
in the Care of the Mentally 111," Provo Papers,
1 October 1976, originally published in 23 Utah
Historical Quarterly (1955)
Bruce R. McConkie, Mormon Doctrine (Salt Lake City:
Brookcraft 1966)
Pasewark, "A Review of Research on the Insanity
Defense" (1986), 477 Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 100 . . .
Jacques Quen, Psychiatry and the Law: Historical
Relevance Today in L. Freeman, By Reason of
Insanity: Essays on Psychiatry and the Law (1987)
23 Utah Historical Quarterly 302 (1955)
R. D. Poll, Utah's History (1989)

iv

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v,

:

TOMAS R. HERRERA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No- 920209

:

and

:

MIKELL SWEEZEY,

:

Case No, 920265

:

Priority No. 11

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The insanity defense has been firmly established in the
criminal law in this country since the adoption of the federal
constitution,

A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (1967)

(hereinafter "Goldstein"); State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 929 (Idaho
1990) (McDevitt, J,, dissenting); Jacques Quen, Psychiatry and the
Law: Historical Relevance Today in L. Freedman, By Reason of
Insanity: Essays on Psychiatry and the Law# 143, 154-7 (1987).
While the defense has been subject to the "evolving aims of the
criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and
medical views of the nature of man" (see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 535-6 (1968)), the basic premise that insane individuals are
not criminally culpable has been a part of this nation's criminal
law jurisprudence throughout the nation's history.
Although the concept of insanity has evolved, until the
Hinckley verdict, that evolution consisted of broadening the defense
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as our understanding of mental processes progressed.

See Goldstein

at 19, 96-7; discussion infra at 14-15 regarding evolution of
insanity defense in Utah.

Until 1983, criticism of the M'Naqhten

defense revolved around the narrow definition of insanity under
M'Naqhten and the failure of the M'Naqhten rule to provide an
insanity defense to all persons who should not be held criminally
culpable based on mental illness.

Goldstein at 11, 46-7; Wayne

LaFave, 1 Substantive Criminal Law 446 (1986) (hereinafter "LaFave").
The controversy surrounding the Hinckley verdict is similar
to the controversy surrounding the M'Naqhten verdict in 1843.1

See

1. Despite the public outcry following the Hinckley verdict, it
should be kept in mind that the insanity plea is "rarely used and
even more rarely successful." R. D. MacKay, Post-Hinckley Insanity
in the U.S.A., 1988 Crim. L. Rev. 88, 89 fn. 10, citing Pasewark,
"A Review of Research on the Insanity Defense" (1986), 477 Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 100.
Historically, the majority of acquittals by reason of insanity have
appeared to be uncontested or stipulated. See Goldstein at 23.
Only a very small percentage of criminal defendants who go to trial
plead not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGBRI"). Goldstein at 22.
Establishing the defense at trial can be very difficult given the
fact that usually only more serious offenders assert the defense,
and the defendant, who must be competent to stand trial, may well
appear sane to the jury at the time of trial. Goldstein at 19, 23-4.
Furthermore, the public's perceived abuse of the insanity
defense following the Hinckley verdict reflects a widespread
misperception of the treatment of individuals found NGBRI. As
Goldstein pointed out:
[IInsanity has become a defense in name alone.
In virtually every state, a successful insanity
defense does not bring freedom with it. Instead,
it has become the occasion for either mandatory
commitment to a mental hospital or for an
exercise of discretion by the court regarding the
advisability of such commitment. And because the
commitment is for treatment, it continues until
such time as the hospital authorities conclude
the patient is ready for release,
(continued)
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R. D. MacKay, Post-Hinckley Insanity in the U.S.A., 1988 Crim. L.
Rev. 88 (hereinafter "MacKay").

Unfortunately, the Utah Legislature

responded to the present-day controversy in an opposite manner than
the House of Lords and severely restricted the use of evidence of
insanity.

Indeed, the current Utah statute is more restrictive and

narrow than the rule in effect in England in 1843, despite extensive
advances in our understanding of the human mind and significant
broadening of the concept of insanity since that time.
Appellants contend that the Utah Legislature has
overstepped its ability to pass laws and thereby violated due
process by precluding criminal defendants from presenting an
affirmative defense of insanity.

Such a defense is fundamental to

notions of fairness, decency and justice and incorporated in the
concepts of state and federal due process.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this case involve questions of
law.

See Appellant's opening brief at 3.

(footnote 1 continued)
Goldstein at 19. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368,
370, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3052, 3053, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (defendant

found NGBRI can be committed based on verdict and can be held in "a
mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or
is no longer a danger to himself or society").
It is interesting to note that pursuant to due process,
Utah's current statute may well limit the jury to a determination
that a defendant is "not guilty" and preclude the use of "NGBRI"
verdict form since the State has failed to prove an element of the
crime. As Justice Durham noted in Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993)
(Durham, J.)# "in Utah, a person found NGBRI is, in effect, not
guilty because he or she did not possess the mental state required
to commit the offense charged."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Fundamental fairness requires that persons who, as the
result of mental illness, do not understand the wrongfulness of
their conduct not be held criminally culpable.

An affirmative

defense of insanity was firmly ingrained in the criminal justice
system at the time the federal constitution was adopted and has been
embraced by the majority of the states.

Federal due process

requires that such an affirmative defense exist.
Utah has shown a heightened and progressive awareness
regarding the treatment of mentally ill persons and a broad and
progressive application of the insanity defense.

State due process

requires that an affirmative defense of insanity exist.
The State is relieved of its burden of proof, in violation
of due process, where evidence of insanity is admissible only for
purposes of negating the mens rea element.
Appellant Herrera has standing to raise this issue.

The

statute is arbitrary and capricious in that it arbitrarily
differentiates between delusional offenders.
A defendant's right to due process and against
self-incrimination is violated where such a defendant is allowed to
introduce evidence of mental illness only for purposes of negating
the mens rea.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME VIOLATES FEDERAL
DUE PROCESS IN THAT IT ELIMINATES AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE OF INSANITY WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM.
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellants' argument in this point is that federal due
process requires that, at a minimum, criminal defendants have a
right to present an insanity defense based on the M'Naghten test.
Appellants claim that this minimum threshold test has been firmly
ingrained in our criminal justice system and that an affirmative
defense of insanity based on this test is fundamental to our
system.

Appellants are not asking this Court to draft a new rule or

assess current, and perhaps fleeting, reactions to the use of this
defense.

Instead, Appellants are asking this Court to recognize

that use of this minimum threshold test is so fundamental to our
notions of fairness that it is protected by due process.
To the extent that this Court agrees that such an
affirmative defense is protected by due process, the State is not
free to outlaw such a defense.

See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502

(1934).
"The language of M'Naghten is fairly simple."
45.

Goldstein at

The rule states:
that to establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.

Goldstein at 45 (emphasis added).
The State claims that Utah's current statute allows a
defense based on the first phrase of M'Naghten but disallows a
defense based on the second phrase.

State's brief at 19-20. The

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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State argues further that the current statute evidences an intent to
relieve individuals from criminal culpability where they are not
"responsible," but to not "exonerate"2 them based on a failure to
know that the conduct was wrong.

State's brief at 17-21.

Even if the State were correct that our current statute
encompasses the first phrase of M^Naghten, the statute nevertheless
violates federal due process since both phrases are constitutionally
mandated.

Since the early 1800's, individuals who fit within either

phrase were absolved of criminal culpability.

The M'Naghten rule

did not make a distinction between those who were not guilty due to
insanity and those who would not be punished based on insanity.
State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1931).

See

Instead, all persons

who fit under either phrase were entitled to an acquittal.

Id.

The Green Court pointed out that while "[n]ot all persons
who are afflicted with insanity, lunacy, idiocy or other unsoundness
of mind are to be exonerated from punishment for their criminal
acts," an individual is "entitled to an acquittal if at that time he
was ... insane to such an extent that he either (1) did not know the
nature of his act ... ; or (2) ... did not know that it was
wrong ... ; or (3) ... was unable by reason of his mental disease to
control his actions or impulses ... " (emphasis added).

Hence,

2. In attempting to make a distinction between the two phrases, the
State appears to be referring to "exoneration from punishment" and
not the more common meaning for the term "exoneration," i.e. relieve
from blame. The State's distinctions without a difference further
complicate an already complex area, and Appellants would urcje this
Court not to adopt the State's labels for the two M'Naghten phrases.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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pursuant to Green, individuals who fit under either phrase were
acquitted; those who fit under the second phrase were not merely
"exonerated from punishment."
In addition, it is not clear that Utah's current statute
encompasses even the first phrase of the M'Naqhten rule.

The first

phrase absolves an individual where that individual did not know the
nature and quality of his act.

By contrast, a person acts

"intentionally" "when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result," and "knowingly" when he
is "aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances" and "aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result."

Neither mental state encompasses the requirement

that the individual be aware of the "quality" of his act, as is
required by the first phrase of M'Naqhten.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-2-103.
Various courts have determined that the two phrases of
M'Naqhten are indistinguishable, i.e. "that the ability to know the
nature and quality of an act is indistinguishable from the ability
to understand its wrongfulness."

State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944,

947 (Alaska 1987), disavowing its earlier reasoning to that effect
in Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1002-3 (Alaska 1962), overruled in
part on other grounds, Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 836 (Alaska
1971), in light of express legislative history.

In Jessner v.

State, 231 N.W. 634, 639 (Wis. 1930), the Court stated that the two
phrases in the M'Naghten test
... express exactly the same thing, but in
different language. They are synonomous, and
their conjunctive use results only in emphasis.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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If a person is unable to distinguish between
right and wrong in respect to an act, he must be
unaware of the nature and quality of the act
which he is doing ..• .
See also Maas v, Territory, 63 P. 960, 961 (Okla. 1901) ("knowledge
of the wrongfulness of an act also embraces capacity to understand
the nature and consequences of the same").

Assuming the two phrases

of M'Naqhten are indistinguishable, Utah's negation of the mens rea
statute does not cover the first phrase since it does not allow an
insanity defense based on the actor's lack of knowledge as to the
wrongfulness of his act.
Further support for this concept that the two phrases of
M'Naqhten are indistinguishable comes from the label generally given
the test.

Throughout case law and commentaries, the M'Naqhten test

is referred to as the "right-wrong test" or by a similar term
denoting the actor's knowledge of the wrongfulness of his or her
conduct.

See LaFave at 427, 436. These labels demonstrate that the

essence of the M'Naqhten test is the actor's knowledge of the
wrongfulness of the conduct.

Hence, Utah's statute does not permit

an affirmative defense of insanity where an individual fits within
the M'Naqhten test.3

3. Although the language of the M'Naqhten rule is fairly simple,
its meaning is not so straightforward. See Goldstein at 47. Little
case law exists which explains the meaning of the two phrases. Id.
at 23, 47-50; LaFave at 439. LaFave suggests that the paucity of
case law explaining the meaning of the two M'Naqhten phrases "is
probably due to the small percentage of defendants who raise an
insanity defense and the extreme rarity of appeals by these
defendants." LaFave at 439. While the precise meaning of the two
phrases has not been extensively litigated, it is apparent that the
rule protects individuals who do not know that their conduct is
wrong.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The State relies heavily on the United States Supreme Court
decision in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118

L.Ed.2d 437 (1992)f in support of its argument that the statute does
not violate federal due process.
Foucha did not consider whether some form of affirmative
insanity defense was constitutionally mandated.

Instead, the Court

held that a state violates due process where it continues to hold a
defendant found NGBRI in a mental institution where the defendant is
no longer mentally ill.
Although the State emphasizes statements made in concurring
opinions in Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (1992), it
recognizes that these statements are dicta.
21-23.

State's brief at

Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion was not

joined by any justices; the Chief Justice joined Justice Kennedy's
dissent.

Hence, a majority of the Court has not embraced the dicta

in Foucha cited by the State.
As Appellants pointed out in their opening brief, the
United States Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue
of whether federal due process requires that a defendant be able to
present a defense of insanity other than the ability to negate the
mens rea.

See Appellants' opening brief at 16-17.

Case law from

the United States Supreme Court does suggest, however, that insane
persons are not criminally culpable and that a distinction exists
between lack of mens rea and an insanity defense.

See Leland v.

Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed.2d 1302 (1952);
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(1968); State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 923-6 (Idaho 1990)
(McDevitt, J., dissenting).
This Court has also never addressed the issue raised in
this part.

Although it has affirmed convictions of mentally ill

offenders, none of these defendants claimed that pursuant to federal
due process they were permitted to present an affirmative defense of
insanity.

See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993); State v.

DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1987); State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d
27, 29 (Utah 1990).
In State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 383-4 (Justice Durham
dissenting and concurring, joined by Justices Stewart and
Zimmerman), a majority of this Court recognized that under the Utah
statute,
a defendant found NGBRI is, in effect, not guilty
because he or she did not possess the mental
state required to commit the offense charged.
There is no assessment of a defendant's capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her
conduct or to conform his or her behavior to the
requirements of law. A good deal of critical
commentary has been directed at this approach,
see, e.g., R. D. MacKay at 92, but the
legislature has maintained it through recent
revisions of the statute.
Appellants are now asking that this Court consider for the
first time the constitutionality of Utah's much criticized statute,
and hold that an affirmative defense of insanity is so fundamental
to our system of justice that it is incorporated in the concept of
federal due process.
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POINT II. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME DENIES
DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTION.
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief)
The historical treatment of the mentally ill in Utah
demonstrates a heightened awareness of the lack of responsibility or
"accountability" of such persons.4
In addition to the request by Governor George Woods in 1872
that Utah address the problems of the mentally ill, quoted on
page 32 of Appellant's opening brief, Governor George W. Emery made
the following statement to the legislative assembly on January 11,
1876:
We need a Territorial Asylum for the
insane, which will afford this class of
unfortunate people proper treatment, at the
public expense unless they are possessed of
sufficient means to defray the necessary charges
attending their case. Such an institution is
indispensible in every State and Territory and
should be under the control of a skillful
physician, who has had experience in treating
this class of patients. Humanity and wise
government, alike, seem to require of us such a
provision, and I suggest some action be taken by
you looking to the establishment of such an
institution even if it be on a limited scale,
though adequate to the present wants of our
people.
23 Utah Historical Quarterly 302 (1955).
The governor made this request for a territorial asylum
even though Salt Lake City had opened a mental institution at the
mouth of Emigration Canyon in 1869.

R. D. Poll, Utah/s

4. The historical information in this reply brief supplements the
historical information outlined in Appellants' opening brief at
32-37.
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History 285 (1989) (hereinafter "Utah's History").

In 1879,

Dr. Seymour Young, a trained medical doctor and nephew to Brigham
Young, purchased the Salt Lake City institution and thereafter ran
it "under contract of the city,"

Id.5

In 1880, the Utah territorial legislature authorized the
Utah Territorial Insane Asylum.

The legislature intended "that the

territorial facility be modern in every regard."

Lester E.

Bush, Jr., Health and Medicine Among the Latter-Day Saints: Science,
Sense and Scripture 119 (1993) (hereinafter "Health and Ktedicine").
"When the Territorial Asylum opened in July 1885, it was heralded as
incorporating all the improvements, conveniences and appointments of
a modern asylum."

Id., quoting Charles R. McKell, "The Utah State

Hospital: A Study in the Care of the Mentally 111," Provo Papers,
1 October 1976, pp. 6-28, originally published in 23 Utah Historical
Quarterly (1955).

In addition, Dr. Walter R. Pike, who "was

probably the most qualified person in the territory," was appointed
as the first superintendent.

Health and Medicine at 119. Hence,

prior to statehood, the government was providing funds and superior
facilities and personnel for treatment of the mentally ill.

This

demonstrates an early, heightened concern for the treatment of the
mentally ill.
This early "commitment to the institutional approach to
care" (Health and Medicine at 119) was "notable" in "that there was

5. Articles written by Dr. Young "generally showed him to be
current with recent developments in the field." Lester E.
Bush, Jr., Health and Medicine Among the Latter-Day Saints: Science,
Sense and Scripture 119 (1993).
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so little opposition to defining individuals as mentally ill/ as
opposed to being possessed of evil spirits or devils, given the
general distrust of medicine and the emphasis upon the supernatural
in every day life."

Utah's History at 285.

This early commitment

to care for the mentally ill as opposed to a belief they were
possessed by spirits also demonstrates the early progressiveness of
Utah in this area.
One of the first acts of the legislature after statehood
was to take over control of the mental institution in Provo.

Utah's

History at 412. This also reflects the awareness of the importance
of treatment for mentally ill persons.
Almost ninety percent of the population of Utah were
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints at the
time Utah achieved statehood.

Utah's History at 397.

Only 28 of

the 107 participants in the constitutional convention held March 4
through May 8, 1895 were non-Mormons.

Hence, Mormon views on the

treatment of the mentally ill should be considered in determining
whether state due process guarantees an affirmative defense of
insanity.
Insane persons who "do not develop mentally to the point
where they know right from wrong" are not accountable under Mormon
doctrine.

B. R. McConkie, Mormon Doctrine (2d ed. 1966) at 853.

Considered at another level the ecclesiastical
status within Mormonism of those who are mentally
handicapped always has been clear. The notion
implicit in LDS scripture that "accountability"
was a prerequisite to baptism (or any other
personal ordinance) was early understood to apply
not just to young children but to any who were
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mentally incapable of accepting responsibility
for their own actions. Thus there has been no
reguirement of baptism or any other formal
ordinance for those who are either severely
retarded or insane.
Health and Medicine at 123 (emphasis added).
This theme that insane persons are not accountable for
their actions is apparent in other areas.

In the context of

suicide, Elder Bruce R. McConkie, a respected leader in the
LDS Church, wrote in part:
Suicide consists in the voluntary and intentional
taking of one's own life, particularly where the
person involved is accountable and has sound mind.
...

Obviously persons subject to great stresses may
lose control of themselves and become mentally
clouded to the point that they are no longer
accountable for their acts. Such are not to be
condemned for taking their own lives.
Mormon Doctrine at 771 (emphasis added).
Historically, Utah has shown a progressive approach for
treatment of the mentally ill and a recognition that insane persons
are not accountable for their actions.

See Appellants7 opening

brief at 32-37 for further discussion of the historical approach to
insanity.

The current statute, which precludes an insanity defense

for persons who are not responsible or "accountable" for their
actions, cuts against this historical concern for and progressive
treatment of the mentally ill.
Over the years, the judicial and statutory definitions of
insanity have, for the most part, broadened as knowledge of mental
processes has progressed.

See Territory v. Catton, 16 P. 902, 907-8

(1888), reversed on other grounds, 130 U.S. 83 (1889) (if individual
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"with ability to refuse11 acts "with the knowledge that it is wrong,
he is responsible" for his actions); State v. Mewhinney, 134 P. 632
(Utah 1913) (M^Naghten test) 6 ; State v. Green, 6 P.2d at 184-6
(M'Naqhten plus inability to control actions or impulses); State v.
Poulsonf 381 P.2d 93, 94-5 (Utah 1963) (upholding use of instruction
outlining M'Naqhten and irresistible impulse tests); legislative
adoption of Model Penal Code substantial capacity test, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-305 (1973); State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah
1982) (recognizing that Utah broadened "the insanity test to conform
to current accepted principles of moral responsibility; cf. State v.
Young, 853 P.2d at 383-4 (Durham, J.) (noting that Utah's approach
is not assessing defendant's capacity to appreciate wrongfulness of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law has been subject to
criticism).
The State points out that Utah's current statutory scheme
holds "all defendants accountable when the prosecution establishes
proof of the elements of the crime and by otherwise rejecting mental
illness as a basis for exoneration."

State's brief at 36.

Holding

insane defendants "accountable" cuts against the historical concern
for and progressive treatment of mentally ill persons in this state
and the fundamental and pervasive acceptance of the notion that

6. In Mewhinney, the Court rejected the irresistible impulse test
despite the "ability to refuse" language in Catton. In Green,
6 P.2d at 189-6, the Court again included the lack of ability to
control one's conduct. Mewhinney is perhaps the only example of the
State narrowing the definition of insanity over the years. Other
than Mewhinney, the judicial and statutory definitions broadened
from territorial times until 1983.
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insane persons are not "accountable."
The Legislature cannot abrogate rights that are protected
by due process.
(1934).

See generally Nebbia v. New Yorkf 291 U.S. 502

The State's argument at 23, 29, 39 that defining the

insanity defense is a legislative function disregards the due
process limitations placed on any legislative act.
Decisions cited by the State for the proposition that
"other decisions [] have [] concluded that restriction of mental
illness evidence is a constitutional legislative action" (State's
brief at 39; see also State's brief at 23, 29) do not involve
statutes which allow evidence of insanity solely for purposes of
negating the mens rea.

For instance, in United States v. Cameron,

907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir. 1990) (cited in State's brief at 39),
the Court discussed the Insanity Defense Reform Act which eliminated
the "lack of volitional control" excuse, but retained the M'Naghten
standard.

See also Haas v. Abrahamson, 910 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.

1990)7 (holding that due process not violated where state disallows
expert testimony as to whether defendant lacked required intent);

7. The State relies on Haas v. Abrahamson, 910 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1990), in support of its argument that states are free to define
insanity without any due process limitations. See State's brief at
13, 29, 39. The issue in Haas was whether Wisconsin could disallow
expert testimony offered by the defendant to establish that he was
incapable of forming the necessary intent. In reaching its decision
that precluding expert testimony on the issue of whether the
defendant could form the requisite mens rea did not violate: due
process, the Court pointed out that "the issues of insanity and
intent, although related, are not identical ... ." Id. at 396.
Haas did not address the issue raised in these cases as to whether
the State could restrict the insanity defense to negation of the
mens rea element, and provides little support for the State's
argument.
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United States v. Pohlot# 827 F.2d 889, 895 (3d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988) (discussing Insanity Defense Reform Act
which retains M'Naqhten standard but deletes "volitional prong" of
Model Penal Code); Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 659 (Alaska App.
1985) (holding that elimination of "irresistible impulse" insanity
defense does not violate due process); Hicks v. State, 352 S.E.2d
762, 775 (Ga. 1987), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987) (upholding
Georgia insanity defense which had right/wrong test and delusional
compulsion test, but did not include "an impulse-control-disorder"
insanity defense); State v. Turrentine, 730 P.2d 238, 242 (Ariz.
App. 1986) (commenting that insanity defense which exonerates
defendant from guilt "represents a public policy adopted by this
state," and pointing out that finding defendant NGBRI under
M'Naqhten test is distinct from mens rea element).

POINT III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 IS
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN VIOLATION OF DUE
PROCESS.
(Reply to Point IV of Appellee's Brief)
A.

APPELLANT HERRERA HAS STANDING.

The State challenges Defendant Herrera's standing to raise
this issue but apparently does not challenge Defendant Sweezey's
standing.

State's brief at 44-6.
Dr. LeBegue holds the opinion that Appellant Herrera

suffered from a mental disease at the time of the offense and "would
qualify for an affirmative defense of insanity as that defense
existed in Utah prior to 1983." RH. 160. At the time of the
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hearings in the trial court, Dr. LeBegue was "unable to state with
certainty whether Tomas Herrera would qualify for the defense of
insanity as presently defined."

RH. 160.

Defense counsel proffered

that
He is mentally ill, your Honor. He is a paranoid
schizophrenic. He experiences hallucinations.
RH. 386; see also 450.

In addition, Appellant Herrera amended his

plea to not guilty or, in the alternative, NGBRI.

R. 374.

Although the State ultimately conceded standing in some
areas, it initially argued
As to the standing issue, what the State's
position would be is that to establish standing
sufficient to raise the constitutionality of
these statutes, that the defendant must show that
he is mentally ill and that that mental illness
does not fit within the current legal definition
as stated under 76-2-305; that because no facts
have been proferred that this Court doesn't have
any basis to conclude whether or not the
defendant has raised any relevant issue.

Later, in arguing over the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, the State claimed:
Your Honor, again, at the time Dr. LeBegue
testified and at the time the defendant made the
strategy decision not to allow him to testify
fully, all that needed to be set forth at that
time was the fact that Mr. Herrera was delusional
and why that would make any difference under the
current statute as opposed to previous law. It
was a due process argument that they were
raising. And to have him state in relationship
to such, as his testimony, that had to do with
delusional offenders which, as I remember
Dr. LeBegue's testimony, was the only thing where
there might be some shift from prior law to
current law. He simply never put Mr. Herrera in
that category; nor was it proper to put him in
that category.
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R. 450-1.
The argument in the trial court appears to have been about
whether or not the State was entitled to an opportunity to
cross-examine Appellant Herrera's expert witness,

R. 448-52, 456.

Defense counsel was concerned about the unlimited cross-examination
the trial judge would allow, and despite the State's argument to the
contrary, Appellant Herrera made an adequate showing that he was
mentally ill and would have been entitled to assert the insanity
defense under the former law.8
As Appellant Herrera argued in the trial court, the facts
of the case as known at that point, R. 60-61, the proffer of
Dr. LeBegue and the affidavit of Dr. LeBegue, show that Appellant
Herrera has standing.

In raising the issue in the trial court,

defense counsel relied on the suggestions in State v. Rhoades, 809
P.2d 455, 459-60 (Idaho 1991).
In Rhoades, the Court recognized that Appellant Herrera
need not present an opinion on the ultimate issue of sanity in order
to raise a claim.

Instead, an expert opinion that sanity might be

an issue in the case or "an assertion by counsel that he was raising
the defense of insanity."
a requirement.

809 P.2d at 459.

Live testimony was not

Summary affidavits from the expert or, in the

8. Regardless of whether Appellant Herrera could assert the defense
under the current law, the current statute severely limits the
defense and precludes the jury from finding Appellant Herrera NGBRI
in the event he is unable to negate the mens rea but able to
establish that he did not know that the act was wrong. Hence, he
has a claim regardless of whether he is also mentally ill under the
current statute.
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alternative, an in camera review of an affidavit by an expert appear
sufficient under Rhoades.

B. THE STATUTE ARBITRARILY DIFFERENTIATES
BETWEEN DELUSIONAL OFFENDERS.
As Dr. LeBegue testified, individuals who suffer from the
same type and severity of mental illness are treated differently
under the statute.

Appellant's opening brief at 44-6.

As Appellants outlined in their opening brief, a defendant
found "guilty and mentally ill" (GAMI) may nevertheless be
imprisoned.

Appellants' opening brief at 26-3 0.

Any of the

following determinations could result in imprisonment rather than
hospitalization:

(1) the defendant is not mentally ill at the time

of sentencing; (2) at the time of sentencing, the defendant is
currently mentally ill, but the various factors weigh in favor of
incarceration rather than hospitalization; (3) the defendant has
achieved "maximum benefit" (whatever that means).
§ 77-169-203.9

Utah Code Ann.

Hence, the GAMI statute severely limits the persons

who will be hospitalized as the result of their mental illness.
In addition, under the current mens rea insanity defense
and the GAMI scheme, persons are held criminally culpable "who are
mentally diseased and who cannot reasonably be used to serve the

9. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(1)(b), the court can
order that a GAMI defendant be "committed to the department for care
and treatment ... for no more than 18 months, or until he has
reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first" (emphasis added).
Under this subsection, a GAMI defendant can be hospitalized for no
more than 18 months before being transferred to the prison.
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purposes of the criminal law."

See generally Goldstein at 11-15

(discussing how M'Naghten defense furthers criminal law goals of
retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation).
Finally, the GAMI statute does not free an individual who
is mentally nonresponsible from criminal culpability.

Although a

person found NGBRI under predecessor statutes could be hospitalized,
a distinction between a conviction and a finding of NGBRI
nevertheless existed.

The advantage enjoyed by the person found

NGBRI is that "he suffers no formal judgment of condemnation."
Goldstein at 20.
The existence of the GAMI statutory scheme fails to
alleviate the due process violations caused by the current insanity
defense.

POINT IV. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-4 VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS AND THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
(Reply to Point VI of Appellee's Brief)
The current statutory scheme requires a defendant who
desires to negate the mens rea requirement based on insanity to
submit to a mental examination.

Appellants' argument in this point

is that such a requirement, where Appellants intend only to negate
the mens rea element, violates due process and the fifth amendment.
In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68
L.Ed.2d 359, 370 (1981), a pre-Hinckley case, the Court stated in
dictum:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 21 -

Nor was the interview analogous to a sanity
examination occasioned by a defendant's plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of
his offense. When a defendant asserts the
insanity defense and introduces supporting
psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive
the state of the only effective means it has of
controverting his proof on an issue that he
interjected into the case. Accordingly, several
Courts of Appeals have held that, under such
circumstances, a defendant can be required to
submit to a sanity examination conducted by the
prosecution's psychiatrist. [citations omitted]
The dictum in Estelle refers to an affirmative defense of
insanity, as universally followed at that time.

A defense of

insanity which entertained only the negation of the mens rea element
was not codified until after Estelle was decided.

Hence, the dictum

in Estelle does not address the issue raised in this part.
Nor did the defendant in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 472
(Utah 1988), challenge the constitutionality of the examination
procedure in light of the limited nature of the insanity defense
available to him.

Instead, Bishop claimed that he was not asserting

a diminished capacity or insanity defense, and was introducing
psychiatric testimony to establish that he had committed a
manslaughter rather than an intentional homicide.
Appellants have not "interjected" an affirmative defense of
insanity into this case.

Instead, they are claiming that requiring

them to be examined where they intend to use mental state only to
negate the mens rea element violates due process and the fifth
amendment.
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CONCUJSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellants Herrera and Sweezey
respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial judges'
orders denying their motions to "Declare Utah Statutory Scheme
Unconstitutional" and remand the cases for trial in which Appellants
are permitted to assert an affirmative defense of insanity.

SUBMITTED this X3/JL day of September, 1993.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Appellants
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